ld obtain for Cuba a satisfactory autonomy, or
independence, or the cession of the island.

It was evident that there was no difference of opinion among those in
authority in the United States as to the fact that Cuba must be severed
from Spain. There were, however, differences of judgment as to which of
the three methods suggested by Woodford was preferable, and there was a
substantial disagreement as to the means necessary to realize the aims
of the American Government. General Woodford believed that Spain would
grant the demands of the United States, if she were given time and were
not pressed to the point of endangering her dignity. The overwhelming
majority in Congress, and particularly the leaders of the dominant
Republican party with the exception of Speaker Reed, refused to believe
in the sincerity of the Spanish Government. The Administration could not
overlook the fact that the Spanish Government, however sincere it might
be, might not be able to execute its promises. Great Britain had just
recognized the United States as intermediary in a dispute between
herself and one of the American nations. Spain, in a dispute much
more serious to the United States, refused publicly to admit American
intervention, while she did recognize that of the Pope and the European
powers. Was it then possible that a Government which was either
unwilling or afraid openly to acknowledge American interest in April
would, by October, yield to the wishes of the Administration? Was it
certain or likely that if the Spanish Government did so yield, it would
remain in power?

Reluctantly President McKinley decided that he could not announce to
Congress that he had secured the acceptance of the American policy.
In his message to Congress on the 11th of April, he reviewed the
negotiation and concluded by recommending forcible intervention. On
the 19th of April, Congress, by joint resolution, called upon Spain to
withdraw from Cuba and authorized the President to use force to compel
her to do so. Congress, however, was not content to leave the future of
the island merely indefinite, but added that the United States did not
desire Cuba and that the "people of the island of Cuba are, and of
right ought to be, free and independent." This decision ruled out both
autonomy and cession as solutions of the problem. It put an end to the
American century-long dream of annexing Cuba, unless the people of the
island themselves desired such a relation; an