iral
Sampson started upon his cruise to San Juan, he requested the
press boats to observe secrecy, and Admiral Chadwick comments with
satisfaction upon the fact that this request was observed "fully and
honorably... by every person except one." When Lieutenant Whitney risked
his life as a spy in order to investigate conditions in Porto Rico; his
plans and purpose were blazoned in the press. Incredible as it may now
seem, the newspaper men appear to have felt themselves part of the army.
They offered their services as equals, and William Randolph Hearst even
ordered one of his staff to sink a vessel in the Suez Canal to delay
Camara on his expedition against Dewey. This order, fortunately for the
international reputation of the United States, was not executed. With
all their blare and childish enthusiasm, the reporters do not seem to
have been so successful in revealing to Americans the plans of Spain as
they were in furnishing her with itemized accounts of all the doings of
the American forces.
While the press not only revealed but formulated courses of action in
the case of the army, the navy, at least, was able to follow its own
plans. For this difference there were several causes, chief of which was
the fact that the navy was a fully professional arm, ready for action
both in equipment and in plans, and able to take a prompt initiative
in carrying out an aggressive campaign. The War Department had a more
difficult task in adjusting itself to the new conditions brought about
by the Spanish American War. The army was made up on the principle
traditionally held in the United States that the available army force in
time of peace should be just sufficient for the purposes of peace, and
that it should be enlarged in time of war. To allow a fair amount of
expansion without too much disturbance to the organization in increasing
to war strength, the regular army was over-officered in peace times. The
chief reliance in war was placed upon the militia. The organization
and training of this force was left, however, under a few very general
directions, to the various States. As a result, its quality varied and
it was nowhere highly efficient in the military sense. Some regiments,
it is true, were impressive on parade, but almost none of the officers
knew anything of actual modern warfare. There had been no preliminary
sifting of ability in the army, and it was only as experience gave
the test that the capable and informed were c
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