ced no confidence in Aguinaldo, and
further was instructed by Secretary Long on the 26th of May as follows:
"It is desirable, as far as possible, and consistent for your success
and safety, not to have political alliances with the insurgents or any
faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain their
cause in the future." Meanwhile foreign nations were rushing vessels
to this critical spot in the Pacific. On the 17th of June, Dewey sent a
cable, which had to be relayed to Hongkong by boat, reporting that there
were collected, in Manila Bay, a French and a Japanese warship, two
British, and three German. Another German man-of-war was expected, which
would make the German squadron as strong as the American.
The presence of so large a German force, it was felt, could hardly fail
to have definite significance, and therefore caused an anxiety at home
which would, indeed, have been all the keener had Admiral Dewey not kept
many of his troubles to himself. European sympathy was almost wholly
with Spain. The French, for instance, had invested heavily in Spanish
bonds, many of which were secured on the Cuban revenues. There was also
perhaps some sense of solidarity among the Latin races in Europe and a
feeling that the United States was a colossus willfully exerting itself
against a weak antagonist. It was not likely that this feeling was
strong enough to lead to action, but at least during that summer of
1898 it was somewhat unpleasant for American tourists in Paris, and an
untoward episode might easily have brought unfriendly sentiment to
a dangerous head. Austria had never been very friendly to the United
States, particularly since the execution of the Emperor Maximilian in
Mexico, which his brother Francis Joseph believed the United States
could have prevented, and was tied to Spain by the fact that the Queen
Regent was an Austrian Hapsburg.
It was evident, moreover, that in Europe there was a vague but
nevertheless real dread of the economic potentialities of the United
States--a fear which led, in the next few years, to the suggestion that
the American invasion of trade should be resisted by a general European
economic organization which would even overrule the natural tendency
of powers to group themselves into hostile camps. In 1898 it seemed
possible that the United States was consciously planning to become a
world military power also, and a feeling, not exactly like Blaine's
"America for the Americans
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