es are immortalized
in Elbert Hubbard's "Message to Garcia," the best American parable of
efficient service since the days of Franklin.

Efficient, however, as was the navy, it was far from being a complete
fighting force. Its fighting vessels were totally unsupplied with
that cloud of servers--colliers, mother ships, hospital ships, and
scouts--which we now know must accompany a fleet. The merchant marine,
then at almost its lowest point, was not in a position entirely to fill
the need. The United States had no extensive store of munitions. Over
all operations there hung a cloud of uncertainty. Except for the short
campaign of the Chino-Japanese War of 1894, modern implements of sea war
remained untested. Scientific experiment, valuable and necessary as
it was, did not carry absolute conviction regarding efficient service.
Would the weapons of offense or defense prove most effective? Accidents
on shipboard and even the total destruction of vessels had been common
to all navies during times of peace. That the Maine had not been a
victim of the failure of her own mechanism was not then certain. Such
misgivings were in the minds of many officers. Indeed, a report of the
total disappearance of two battling fleets would not have found the
watchful naval experts of the world absolutely incredulous. So much the
higher, therefore, was the heroism of those who led straight to battle
that complex and as yet unproved product of the brain--the modern
warship.

While negotiations with Spain were in their last stages, at the orders
of Secretary Long a swift vessel left San Francisco for Honolulu. There
its precious cargo was transferred to the warship Baltimore, which
then made hurriedly for Hongkong. It contained the ammunition which
was absolutely necessary if Commodore George Dewey, in command of the
Asiatic squadron, was to play a part in the war. The position of his
squadron, even after it received its ammunition, was indeed singular.
After the war began, it was unable to obtain coal or other supplies from
any neutral port and at the same time it was equally unable to remain in
any such port without being interned for the duration of the war. There
remained but one course of action. It must not be forgotten that the
Spanish empire stretched eastward as well as westward. Already William
Pitt, when he had foreseen in 1760 the entrance of Spain into the war
which England was then waging with France, had planned expeditions
again