re deferred until the events which they describe have passed into
history.

Such, we may suppose, to be the case in respect to the Reports of
Brigadier-Generals Barnard and Barry on the Engineer and Artillery
Operations of the Army of the Potomac. Written, as these Reports were,
after the organization of that army had been completed and the
Peninsular campaign had terminated, by men who, though playing an
important part in its organization and throughout this its first
campaign, yet never aspired to be its heroes, we may reasonably hope,
that, if they have not told the "whole truth," they have told us
"nothing but the truth."

The points of particular interest in these Reports, so far as relates to
organization, are the inauguration of a great system of
field-fortifications for the defence of the national capital, and the
preparation of engineer-equipments, particularly bridge-equipage for
crossing rivers. These are only sketched, but the outline is drawn by an
artist who is master of the subject. The professional engineer, when he
examines the immense fortifications of Washington and sees their
skilful construction, can appreciate the labor and thought which must
have been bestowed on them. He alone could complete the picture. To
appreciate these works, they must be seen. No field-works on so
extensive a scale have been undertaken in modern times. The nearest
approach to them were the lines of Torres Vedras, in Portugal,
constructed by the British army in 1809-10; but the works constructed by
General Barnard for the defence of Washington are larger, more numerous,
more carefully built, and much more heavily armed than were those justly
celebrated lines of Wellington.

And it should not be forgotten, that, after the Battle of Bull Run, we
were thrown on the defensive, and the fortifications of our capital were
called for in a hurry. There were no models, in this country, from which
to copy,--and few, if any, in Europe. Luckily, however, the art of
fortification is not imitative; it is based on scientific principles;
and we found in General Barnard and his assistants the science to
comprehend the problem before them, and the experience and skill to
grasp its solution.

Only the citizens of Washington and those who happened to be there after
the two disastrous defeats at Bull Run can appreciate the value of these
fortifications. They have twice saved the capital,--perhaps the nation;
yet forts are passive,--they neve