object was
thrown up. But it was too late. Lee's guns had been heard in the
afternoon, in the neighborhood of Mechanicsville, attacking the advance
of our right wing, and Jackson was within supporting distance. The
battle of the twenty-seventh of June, on which "hinged the fate of the
campaign," was to be fought to-morrow. This battle, or rather the policy
of fighting it, or suffering it to be fought, has been more criticized
than any other battle of the campaign. We fought a battle which was
decisive against us with less than one-third of our force.

General Barnard is severe in his criticisms. In his "retrospect,
pointing out the mistakes that were made," he says,--

"At last a moment came when action was imperative. The enemy assumed the
initiative, and we had warning of when and where he was to strike. Had
Porter been withdrawn the night of the twenty-sixth, our army would have
been _concentrated_ on the right bank, while two corps at least of the
enemy's force were on the _left_ bank. Whatever course we then took,
whether to strike at Richmond and the portion of the enemy on the right
bank, or move at once for the James, we would have had a concentrated
army, and a fair chance of a brilliant result, in the first place; and
in the second, if we accomplished nothing, we would have been in the
same case on the morning of the twenty-seventh as we were on that of the
twenty-eighth,--_minus_ a lost battle and a compulsory retreat; or, had
the fortified lines (thrown up _expressly_ for the object) been held by
twenty thousand men, (as they could have been,) we could have fought on
the other side with eighty thousand men instead of twenty-seven
thousand; or, finally, had the lines been abandoned, with our hold on
the right bank of the Chickahominy, we might have fought and crushed the
enemy on the left bank, reopened our communications, and then returned
and taken Richmond.

"As it was, the enemy fought with his _whole force_, (except enough left
before our lines to keep up an appearance,) and we fought with
twenty-seven thousand men, losing the battle and nine thousand men.

"By this defeat we were driven from our position, our advance of
conquest turned into a retreat for safety, by a force probably not
greatly superior to our own."

It is to be hoped that the forthcoming report of General McClellan will
give us the reasons which induced him to risk such a battle with such a
force, and modify, to some extent at leas