ficers of engineers performed
their duties. Yet thus far their services are ignored and unrecognized,
while distinctions have been bestowed upon those who have had the good
fortune to command troops. Under such circumstances it can hardly be
expected that the few engineer officers yet remaining will willingly
continue their services in this unrequited branch of the military
profession. We have no sufficient officers of engineers at this time
with any of our armies to commence another siege, nor can they be
obtained. In another war, if their services are thus neglected in this,
we shall have none."

It is to be hoped that the General's appeal for additional rank to the
officers of engineers will not be overlooked. The officers of this corps
have demonstrated not only their skill as engineers, but also their
ability to command troops and even armies. On the side of our country's
cause we have McClellan, Halleck, Rosecrans, Meade, Gillmore, and
Barnard, besides a score of others, all generals; and in the ranks of
the Rebels we find Lee, Joe Johnston, Beauregard, Gilmer, and Smith, all
generals, too, and all formerly officers of engineers. Nobly have they
all vindicated the scale of proficiency which placed them among the
distinguished of their respective classes at their common Alma Mater.

Whatever may have been the services of other men during our present
struggle for nationality, and whatever may be their services in the
future, to General Barry, the Chief of Artillery of the Army of the
Potomac, from the organization of that army to the close of the
Peninsular campaign, more than to any other person, belongs the credit
of organizing our admirable system of field-artillery.

We have two reports from General Barry: one, on "The Organization of the
Artillery of the Army of the Potomac"; the other, a "Report of the
Operations of the Artillery at the Siege of Yorktown." Of the services
of the artillery during the remainder of the campaign we have no record
from its chief; but they were conspicuous on every battle-field, and
will not be forgotten until Malvern Hill shall have passed into
oblivion.

After the first Battle of Bull Run, the efforts of the nation were
directed to organizing an army for the defence of the national capital.
Of men and money we had plenty; but men and money, however necessary
they may be, do not make an army. Cannon, muskets, rifles, pistols,
sabres, horses, mules, wagons, harness, bridges, too