the heavy requisitions
upon them, be proud of such a record. It is one of the most striking
exponents of the resources of the nation which the war has produced.

Of this force thirty batteries were _regulars_ and sixty-two
_volunteers_. The latter had to be instructed not only in the duties of
a soldier, but in the theory and practice of their special arm.
Defective guns and _materiel_ furnished by the States had to be
withdrawn, and replaced by the more serviceable ordnance with which the
regular batteries were being armed. Boards of examination were
organized, and the officers thoroughly examined. Incompetency was set
aside, zeal and efficiency rewarded by promotion.

"Although," says General Barry, "there was much to be improved," yet
"many of the volunteer batteries evinced such zeal and intelligence, and
availed themselves so industriously of the instructions of the regular
officers, their commanders, and of the example of the regular battery,
their associate, that they made rapid progress, and finally attained a
degree of proficiency highly creditable."

At the siege of Yorktown, as has already been stated, only one of the
fifteen batteries was permitted to open fire on the enemy's works. This
was armed with one hundred- and two hundred-pounder rifled guns, and it
is remarkable that this is the first time the practicability of placing,
handling, and serving these guns in siege-operations, and their value at
the long range of two and a half to three miles, were fully
demonstrated. These guns, as also the thirteen-inch sea-coast mortars,
which were placed in position ready for use, were giants when compared
with the French and English pigmies which were used at Sebastopol.

General Barry, as well as General Barnard, complains of the want of rank
of his officers. With the immense artillery force that accompanied the
Army of the Potomac to the Peninsula, consisting of sixty batteries of
three hundred and forty-three guns, he had only ten field-officers, "a
number obviously insufficient, and which impaired to a great degree the
efficiency of the arm, in consequence of the want of rank and official
influence of the commanders of corps and divisional artillery. As this
faulty organization can only be suitably corrected by legislative
action, it is earnestly hoped that the attention of the proper
authorities may be at an early day invited to it."

When the report of General McClellan is published, the services of the