ls, food, clothing,
and numberless other things, are required; but men and money, with all
this added _materiel_ of war, still will not make an _efficient_ army.
Organization, discipline, and instruction are necessary to accomplish
this. At the time of which we speak the people of this country did not
comprehend what an army consisted of, or, if they did, they comprehended
it as children,--by its trappings, its men and horses, its drums and
fifes, its "pomp and circumstance."

Few even of our best officers who had honestly studied their profession
had ever seen an army, or fully realized the amount of labor that was
necessary, even with our unbounded resources, to organize an efficient
army ready for the field. Happily for our country, there were some who
in garrison had learned the science and theory of war, and in Mexico, or
in expeditions against our Western Indians, had acquired some knowledge
of its practice. Of these General McClellan was selected to be the
chief. He had seen armies in Europe, and it was believed that he could
bring to his aid more of the right kind of experience for organization
than any other man. If there is any one thing more than another for
which General McClellan is distinguished, it is his ability to _make an
army_. Men may have their opinions as to his genius or his courage, his
politics or his generalship; they may think he is too slow or too
cautious, or they may say he is not equal to great emergencies; but of
his ability to organize an army there is a concurrent opinion in his
favor.

By himself, however, he would have been helpless. He required
assistance. He was obliged to have chiefs of the several arms about
him,--a chief of engineers, of artillery, of cavalry, and chiefs of the
several divisions of infantry.

General Barry was his chief of artillery. To him was assigned the duty
of organizing this arm of the service. We learn from his Report, that,
"when Major-General McClellan was appointed to the command of the
'Division of the Potomac,' July 25th, 1861, a few days after the first
Battle of Bull Run, the whole field-artillery of his command consisted
of no more than parts of nine batteries, or thirty pieces of various,
and, in some instances, unusual and unserviceable calibres. Most of
these batteries were also of mixed calibres. My calculations were based
upon the expected immediate expansion of the 'Division of the Potomac'
into the 'Army of the Potomac,' to consist of at