main
neutral during the Russo-Turkish War, that she stipulated for a large
addition of territory if the Turks were forced to quit Europe; also that
a great Bulgaria should be formed, and that Servia and Montenegro should
be extended so as to become conterminous. To the present writer this
account appears suspect. It is inconceivable that Austria should have
assented to an expansion of these principalities which would bar her
road southward to Salonica[115].

[Footnote 115: Elie de Cyon, _Histoire de l'Entente franco-russe_, chap,
i.; and in _Nouvelle Revue_ for June 1, 1887. His account bears obvious
signs of malice against Germany and Austria.]

Another and more probable version was given by the Hungarian Minister,
M. Tisza, during the course of debates in the Hungarian Delegations in
the spring of 1887, to this effect:--(1) No Power should claim an
exclusive right of protecting the Christians of Turkey, and the Great
Powers should pronounce on the results of the war; (2) Russia would
annex no land on the right (south) bank of the Danube, would respect the
integrity of Roumania, and refrain from touching Constantinople; (3) if
Russia formed a new Slavonic State in the Balkans, it should not be at
the expense of non-Slavonic peoples; and she would not claim special
rights over Bulgaria, which was to be governed by a prince who was
neither Russian nor Austrian; (4) Russia would not extend her military
operations to the districts west of Bulgaria. These were the terms on
which Austria agreed to remain neutral; and in certain cases she claimed
to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina[116].

[Footnote 116: Debidour, _Hist. diplomatique de l'Europe_ (1814-1878),
vol. ii. p. 502.] Doubtless these, or indeed any, concessions to
Austria were repugnant to Alexander II. and Prince Gortchakoff; but her
neutrality was essential to Russia's success in case war broke out; and
the Czar's Government certainly acted with much skill in securing the
friendly neutrality of the Power which in 1854 had exerted so paralysing
a pressure on the Russian operations on the Lower Danube.

Nevertheless, Alexander II. still sought to maintain the European
Concert with a view to the exerting of pacific pressure upon Turkey.
Early in March he despatched General Ignatieff on a mission to the
capitals of the Great Powers; except at Westminster, that envoy found
opinion favourable to the adoption of some form of coercion against
Turkey, in case the Sultan sti