er to occupy Plevna. Knowing nothing of Osman's
whereabouts, his vanguard advanced heedlessly on the town, only to meet
with a very decided repulse, which cost the Russians 3000 men (July 20).

[Footnote 144: Herbert, _The Defence of Plevna_, p. 129.]

Osman now entrenched himself on the open downs that stretch eastwards
from Plevna. As will be seen by reference to the map on page 213, his
position, roughly speaking, formed an ellipse pointing towards the
village of Grivitza. Above that village his engineers threw up two great
redoubts which dominated the neighbourhood. Other redoubts and trenches
screened Plevna on the north-east and south. Finally, the crowns of
three main slopes lying to the east of Plevna bristled with defensive
works. West of the town lay the deep vale of the little River Wid,
itself the chief defence on that side. We may state here that during the
long operations against Plevna the Russians had to content themselves
with watching this western road to Orkanye and Sofia by means of
cavalry; but the reinforcements from Sofia generally made their way in.
From that same quarter the Turks were also able to despatch forces to
occupy the town of Lovtcha, between Plevna and the Shipka Pass.

The Russian Staff, realising its error in not securing this important
centre of roads, and dimly surmising the strength of the entrenchments
which Osman was throwing up near to the base of their operations,
determined to attack Plevna at once. Their task proved to be one of
unexpected magnitude. Already the long curve of the outer Turkish lines
spread along slopes which formed natural glacis, while the ground
farther afield was so cut up by hollows as to render one combined
assault very difficult. The strength, and even the existence, of some of
Osman's works were unknown. Finally, the Russians are said to have had
only 32,000 infantry men at hand with two brigades of cavalry.

Nevertheless, Generals Kruedener and Schahofski received orders to attack
forthwith. They did so on July 31. The latter, with 12,000 men took two
of the outer redoubts on the south side, but had to fall back before the
deadly fire that poured on him from the inner works. Kruedener operated
against the still stronger positions on the north; but, owing to
difficulties that beset his advance, he was too late to make any
diversion in favour of his colleague. In a word, the attack was ill
planned and still worse combined. Five hours of desperate fi