n the British Note of May 1,
1877, there was at present little risk of a collision between the two
Powers for the causes already stated. The Government of the Czar showed
that it desired to keep on friendly terms with the Cabinet of St. James,
for, in reply to a statement of Lord Derby that the security of
Constantinople, Egypt, and the Suez Canal was a matter of vital concern
for Great Britain, the Russian Chancellor, Prince Gortchakoff, on May 30
sent the satisfactory assurance that the two latter would remain outside
the sphere of military operations; that the acquisition of the Turkish
capital was "excluded from the views of His Majesty the Emperor," and
that its future was a question of common interest which could be settled
only by a general understanding among the Powers[129]. As long as Russia
adhered to these promises there could scarcely be any question of Great
Britain intervening on behalf of Turkey.

[Footnote 129: Hertslet, vol. iv. p. 2625.]

Thus the general situation in the spring of 1877 scarcely seemed to
warrant the hopes with which the Turks entered on the war. They stood
alone confronting a Power which had vastly greater resources in men and
treasure. Seeing that the Sultan had recently repudiated a large part of
the State debt, and could borrow only at exorbitant rates of interest,
it is even now mysterious how his Ministers managed to equip very
considerable forces, and to arm them with quick-firing rifles and
excellent cannon. The Turk is a born soldier, and will fight for nothing
and live on next to nothing when his creed is in question; but that does
not solve the problem how the Porte could buy huge stores of arms and
ammunition. It had procured 300,000 American rifles, and bought 200,000
more early in the war. On this topic we must take refuge in the domain
of legend, and say that the life of Turkey is the life of a phoenix: it
now and again rises up fresh and defiant among the flames.

As regards the Ottoman army, an English officer in its service,
Lieutenant W.V. Herbert, states that the artillery was very good,
despite the poor supply of horses; that the infantry was very good; the
regular cavalry mediocre, the irregular cavalry useless. He estimates
the total forces in Europe and Asia at 700,000; but, as he admits that
the battalions of 800 men rarely averaged more than 600, that total is
clearly fallacious. An American authority believes that Turkey had not
more than 250,000 men ready