that the signs of sluggishness which he at
first displayed formed a necessary part of a deep-laid scheme for luring
the Russians to their doom. Let the invaders enter Central Bulgaria in
force, and expose their flanks to Abdul-Kerim in the Quadrilateral, and
to Osman Pasha at Widdin; then the Turks, by well-concerted moves
against those flanks, would drive the enemy back on the Danube, and
perhaps compel a large part of his forces to lay down their arms. Such
is their explanation of the conduct of Abdul-Kerim.

As the Turkish Government is wholly indifferent to the advance of
historical knowledge, it is impossible even now to say whether this idea
was definitely agreed on as the basis of the plan of campaign. There are
signs that Abdul-Kerim and Osman Pasha adopted it, but whether it was
ever approved by the War Council at Constantinople is a different
question. Such a plan obviously implied the possession of great powers
of self-control by the Sultan and his advisers, in face of the initial
success of the Russians; and unless that self-control was proof against
panic, the design could not but break down at the crucial point. Signs
are not wanting that in the suggestions here tentatively offered, we
find a key that unlocks the riddle of the Danubian campaign of 1877.

At first Abdul-Kerim in the Quadrilateral, and Osman at Widdin,
maintained a strict defensive. The former posted small bodies of troops,
probably not more than 20,000 in all, at Sistova, Nicopolis, and other
neighbouring points. But, apart from a heavy bombardment of Russian and
Roumanian posts on the northern bank, neither commander did much to mar
the hostile preparations. This want of initiative, which contrasted with
the enterprise displayed by the Turks in 1854, enabled the invaders to
mature their designs with little or no interruption.

The Russian plan of campaign was to destroy or cripple the four small
Turkish ironclads that patrolled the lower reaches of the river, to
make feints at several points, and to force a passage at two
places--first near Ibrail into the Dobrudscha, and thereafter, under
cover of that diversion, from Simnitza to Sistova. The latter place of
crossing combined all the possible advantages. It was far enough away
from the Turkish Quadrilateral to afford the first essentials of safety;
it was known to be but weakly held; its position on the shortest line of
road between the Danube and a practicable pass of the Balkans--the