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nd smoke, his eyes haggard and bloodshot, and his voice quite gone. I never before saw such a picture of battle[148]." [Footnote 148: _War Correspondence of the "Daily News,"_ pp. 479-483. For another character-sketch of Skobeleff see the _Fortnightly Review_ of Oct. 1882, by W.K. Rose.] Thus all the efforts of the Russians and Roumanians had failed to wrest more than a single redoubt from the Moslems; and at that point they were unable to make any advance against the inner works. The fighting of September 11-12 is believed to have cost the allies 18,000 men killed and wounded out of the 75,000 infantrymen engaged. The mistakes of July 31 had been again repeated. The number of assailants was too small for an attack on so great an extent of fortified positions defended with quick-firing rifles. Had the Russians, while making feints at other points to hold the Turks there, concentrated their efforts either on the two Grivitza redoubts, or on those about the Kavanlik work, they would almost certainly have succeeded. As it was, they hurled troops in close order against lines, the strength of which was not well known; and none of their commanders but Skobeleff employed tactics that made the most of their forces[149]. The depression at the Russian headquarters was now extreme[150]. On September 13 the Emperor held a council of war at which the Prince of Roumania, the Grand Duke Nicholas, General Milutin (Minister of War), and three other generals were present. The Grand Duke declared that the only prudent course was to retire to the Danube, construct a _tete de pont_ guarding the southern end of their bridge and, after receiving reinforcements, again begin the conquest of Bulgaria. General Milutin, however, demurred to this, seeing that Osman's army was not mobile enough to press them hard; he therefore proposed to await the reinforcements in the positions around Plevna. The Grand Duke thereupon testily exclaimed that Milutin had better be placed in command, to which the Emperor replied: "No; you shall retain the command; but the plan suggested by the Minister of War shall be carried out[151]." [Footnote 149: For an account of the battle, see Greene, _op. cit._ pt. ii. chap. v.] [Footnote 150: Gen. von. Lignitz, _Aus drei Kriegen_, p. 167.] [Footnote 151: Col. F.A. Wellesley, _op. cit._ p. 281.] The Emperor's decision saved the situation. The Turks made no combined effort to advance towards Plevna in force; and O
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