lied an indirect encouragement to the "sick man" to enter on a strife
for which he was manifestly unequal, and in which we did not mean to
help him. But these considerations failed to move Lord Beaconsfield and
the Foreign Office from the paths of tradition and routine[126].

[Footnote 125: _Sir William White: Life and Correspondence_, pp.
115-117.]

[Footnote 126: For the power of tradition in the Foreign Office, see
_Sir William White: Life and Correspondence_, p. 119.]

Finally, in looking at the events of 1875-76 in their broad outlines, we
may note the verdict of a veteran diplomatist, whose conduct before the
Crimean War proved him to be as friendly to the interests of Turkey as
he was hostile to those of Russia, but who now saw that the situation
differed utterly from that which was brought about by the aggressive
action of Czar Nicholas I. in 1854. In a series of letters to the
_Times_ he pointed out the supreme need of joint action by all the
Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris; that that treaty by no means
prohibited their intervention in the affairs of Turkey; that wise and
timely intervention would be to the advantage of that State; that the
Turks had always yielded to coercion if it were of overwhelming
strength, but only on those terms; and that therefore the severance of
England from the European Concert was greatly to be deplored[127]. In
private this former champion of Turkey went even farther, and declared
on Sept. 10, 1876, that the crisis in the East would not have become
acute had Great Britain acted conjointly with the Powers[128]. There is
every reason to believe that posterity will endorse this judgment of
Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

[Footnote 127: Letters of Dec. 31, 1875, May 16, 1876, and Sept. 9,
1876, republished with others in _The Eastern Question_, by Lord
Stratford de Redcliffe (1881).]

[Footnote 128: J. Morley, _Life of Gladstone_, vol. ii. p. 555.]

CHAPTER VIII

THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR

"Knowledge of the great operations of war can be acquired
only by experience and by the applied study of the campaigns
of all the great captains. Gustavus, Turenne, and Frederick,
as well as Alexander, Hannibal, and Caesar, have all acted on
the same principles. To keep one's forces together, to bear
speedily on any point, to be nowhere vulnerable,--such are
the principles that assure victory."--NAPOLEON.

Despite the menace to Russia contained i