t. aft: her sides rose 3 ft. above the water, and
her capacity was 35 tons. The secret intelligence of the Admiralty for
the years 1804 and 1805 also shows that Dutch sailors were equally
convinced of the unseaworthiness of these craft: Admiral Verhuell
plainly told the French Emperor that, however flatterers might try to
persuade him of the feasibility of the expedition, "nothing but
disgrace could be expected." The same volume (No. 426) contains a
report of the capture of two of the larger class of French _chaloupes_
off Cape La Hogue. Among the prisoners was a young French royalist
named La Bourdonnais: when forced by the conscription to enter
Napoleon's service, he chose to serve with the _chaloupes_ "because
of his conviction that all these flotillas were nothing but bugbears
and would never attempt the invasion so much talked of and in which so
few persons really believe." The same was the opinion of the veteran
General Dumouriez, who, now an exile in England, drew up for our
Government a long report on the proposed invasion and the means of
thwarting it. The reports of our spies also prove that all experienced
seamen on the Continent declared Napoleon's project to be either a
ruse or a foolhardy venture.

The compiler of the Ney "Memoirs," who was certainly well acquainted
with the opinions of that Marshal, then commanding the troops at
Boulogne, also believed that the flotilla was only able to serve as a
gigantic ferry.[322] The French admirals were still better aware of
the terrible risks to their crowded craft in a fight out at sea. They
also pointed out that the difference in the size, draught, and speed
of the boats must cause the dispersion of the flotilla, when its parts
might fall a prey to the more seaworthy vessels of the enemy. Indeed,
the only chance of crossing without much loss seemed to be offered by
a protracted calm, when the British cruisers would be helpless against
a combined attack of a cloud of row-boats. The risks would be greater
during a fog, when the crowd of boats must be liable to collision,
stranding on shoals, and losing their way. Even the departure of this
quaint armada presented grave difficulties: it was found that the
whole force could not clear the harbour in a single tide; and a part
of the flotilla must therefore remain exposed to the British fire
before the whole mass could get under way. For all these reasons
Bruix, the commander of the flotilla, and Decres, Minister of Mar