"Memoires de Massena," Yol. ii.;" Pieces
Just.," No. 3; also Bouvier, _op. cit._)]

[Footnote 42: Jomini, vol. viii., p. 340; "Pieces Justifs."]

[Footnote 43: "Un Homme d'autrefois," par Costa de Beauregard.]

[Footnote 44: These were General Beaulieu's words to Colonel Graham on
May 22nd.]

[Footnote 45: Periods of ten days, which, in the revolutionary
calendar, superseded the week.]

[Footnote 46: I have followed the accounts given by Jomini, vol.
viii., pp. 120-130; that by Schels in the "Oest. Milit. Zeitschrift"
for 1825, vol. ii.; also Bouvier "Bonaparte en Italie," ch. xiii.; and
J.G.'s "Etudes sur la Campagne de 1796-97." Most French accounts,
being based on Napoleon's "Memoires," vol. iii., p. 212 _et seq_., are
a tissue of inaccuracies. Bonaparte affected to believe that at Lodi
he defeated an army of sixteen thousand men. Thiers states that the
French cavalry, after fording the river at Montanasso, influenced the
result: but the official report of May 11th, 1796, expressly states
that the French horse could not cross the river at that place till the
fight was over. See too Desvernois, "Mems.," ch, vii.]

[Footnote 47: Bouvier (p. 533) traces this story to Las Cases and
discredits it.]

[Footnote: 48 Directorial despatch of May 7th, 1796. The date rebuts
the statement of M. Aulard, in M. Lavisse's recent volume, "La
Revolution Francaise," p. 435, that Bonaparte suggested to the
Directory the pillage of Lombardy.]

[Footnote 49: "Corresp.," June 6th, 1797.]

[Footnote 50: "Corresp.," June 1st, 1796.]

[Footnote 51: Gaffarel, "Bonaparte et les Republiques Italiennes," p.
22.]

[Footnote 52: "Corresp.," May 17th, 1796.]

[Footnote 53: Virgil, Aeneid, x. 200.]

[Footnote 54: Colonel Graham's despatches.]

[Footnote 55: "Corresp.," June 26th, 1796.]

[Footnote 56: Despatch of Francis to Wuermser, July 14th, 1796.]

[Footnote 57: Jomini (vol. viii., p. 305) blames Weyrother, the chief
of Wuermser's staff, for the plan. Jomini gives the precise figures of
the French on July 25th: Massena had 15,000 men on the upper Adige;
Augereau, 5,000 near Legnago; Sauret, 4,000 at Salo; Serurier, 10,500
near Mantua; and with others at and near Peschiera the total fighting
strength was 45,000. So "J.G.," p. 103.]

[Footnote 58: See Thiebault's amusing account ("Memoirs," vol. i., ch.
xvi.) of Bonaparte's contempt for any officer who could not give him
definite information, and of the devices by which his or