eas, Ireland would have been lost to the
United Kingdom; and Britain, exhausted also by the expenses which the
Boulogne preparations had compelled her to make for the defence of
London, must have succumbed.

If ever Napoleon intended risking all his fortunes on the conquest of
England, it can be proved that his mind was gradually cleared of
illusions. He trusted that a popular rising would overthrow the British
Government: people and rulers showed an accord that had never been known
since the reign of Queen Anne. He believed, for a short space, that the
flotilla could fight sea-going ships out at sea: the converse was proved
up to the hilt. Finally, he trusted that Villeneuve, when burdened with
Spanish ships, would outwit and outmanoeuvre Nelson!

What then remained after these and many other disappointments? Surely
that scheme alone was practicable, in which the command of the sea
formed only an unimportant factor. For the conquest of England it was
an essential factor. In Ireland alone could Napoleon find the
conditions on which he counted for success--a discontented populace
that would throng to the French eagles, and a field of warfare where
the mere landing of 20,000 veterans would decide the campaign.[340]

And yet it is, on the whole, certain that his expedition for Ireland
was meant merely to distract and paralyze the defenders of Great
Britain, while he dealt the chief blow at London. Instinct and
conviction alike prompted him to make imposing feints that should lead
his enemy to lay bare his heart, and that heart was our great capital.
His indomitable will scorned the word _impossible_--"a word found only
in the dictionary of fools"; he felt England to be the sole barrier to
his ambitions; and to crush her power he was ready to brave, not only
her stoutest seamen, but also her guardian angels, the winds and
storms. Both the man and the occasion were unique in the world's
history and must not be judged according to tame probabilities. For
his honour was at stake. He was so deeply pledged to make use of the
vast preparations at his northern ports that, had all his complex
dispositions worked smoothly, he would certainly have attempted a dash
at London; and only after some adequate excuse could he consent to give
up that adventure.

The excuse was now furnished by Villeneuve's retreat to Cadiz; and
public opinion, ignorant of Napoleon's latest instructions on that
subject, and knowing only the salient facts