or his own army. On April 27th he decided
against the first (except for a detachment), because Moreau's advance
was too slow to safeguard his rear on that route. He now preferred the
Great St. Bernard, but still doubted whether, after crossing, he
should make for Milan, or strike at Massena's besiegers, in case that
general should be very hard pressed. Like all great commanders, he
started with a general plan, but he arranged the details as the
situation required. In his letter of May 19th, he poured scorn on
Parisian editors who said he prophesied that in a month he would be at
Milan. "That is not in my character. Very often I do _not_ say what I
know: but never do I say what will be."

The better to hide his purpose, he chose as his first base of
operations the city of Dijon, whence he seemed to threaten either the
Swabian or the Italian army of his foes. But this was not enough. At
the old Burgundian capital he assembled his staff and a few regiments
of conscripts in order to mislead the English and Austrian spies;
while the fighting battalions were drafted by diverse routes to Geneva
or Lausanne. So skilful were these preparations that, in the early
days of May, the greater part of his men and stores were near the lake
of Geneva, whence they were easily transferred to the upper valley of
the Rhone. In order that he might have a methodical, hard-working
coadjutor he sent Berthier from the office of the Ministry of War,
where he had displayed less ability than Bernadotte, to be
commander-in-chief of the "army of reserve." In reality Berthier was,
as before in Italy and Egypt, chief of the staff; but he had the
titular dignity of commander which the constitution of 1800 forbade
the First Consul to assume.

On May 6th Bonaparte left Paris for Geneva, where he felt the pulse of
every movement in both campaigns. At that city, on hearing the report
of his general of engineers, he decided to take the Great St. Bernard
route into Italy, as against the Simplon. With redoubled energy, he
now supervised the thousands of details that were needed to insure
success: for, while prone to indulging in grandiose schemes, he
revelled in the work which alone could bring them within his grasp:
or, as Wellington once remarked, "Nothing was too great or too small
for his proboscis." The difficulties of sending a large army over the
Great St. Bernard were indeed immense. That pass was chosen because it
presented only five leagues of groun