frequently interfered in purely political matters. The abolition of
these and other privileged corporations in 1789 unified France and
left not a single barrier to withstand either the flood of democracy
or the backwash of reaction. Everything therefore favoured the action
of the First Consul in drawing all local powers under his own control.
France was for the moment weary of elective bodies, that did little
except waste the nation's taxes; and though there was some opposition
to the new proposal, it passed on February 16th, 1800 (28 Pluviose,
an, viii).

It substituted local government by the central power for local
self-government. The local divisions remained the same, except that
the "districts," abolished by the Convention, were now reconstituted
on a somewhat larger scale, and were termed _arrondissements_, while
the smaller communes, which had been merged in the cantons since 1795,
were also revived. It is noteworthy that, of all the areas mapped out
by the Constituent Assembly in 1789-90, only the Department and canton
have had a continuous existence--a fact which seems to show the peril
of tampering with well-established boundaries, and of carving out a
large number of artificial districts, which speedily become the
_corpus vile_ of other experimenters. Indeed, so little was there of
effective self-government that France seems to have sighed with relief
when order was imposed by Bonaparte in the person of a Prefect. This
important official, a miniature First Consul, was to administer the
affairs of the Department, while sub-prefects were similarly placed
over the new _arrondissements_, and mayors over the communes. The
mayors were appointed by the First Consul in communes of more than
5,000 souls: by the prefects in the smaller communes: all were alike
responsible to the central power.

The rebound from the former electoral system, which placed all local
authority ultimately in the hands of the voters, was emphasized by
Article 75 of the constitution, which virtually raised officials
beyond reach of prosecution. It ran thus: "The agents of the
Government, other than the Ministers, cannot be prosecuted for facts
relating to their duties except by a decision of the Council of State:
in that case the prosecution takes place before the ordinary
tribunals." Now, as this decision rested with a body composed almost
entirely of the higher officials, it will be seen that the chance of
a public prosecution of an offi