cial became extremely small. France was
therefore in the first months of 1800 handed over to a hierarchy of
officials closely bound together by interest and _esprit de corps_;
and local administration, after ten years of democratic experiments,
practically reverted to what it had been under the old monarchy. In
fact, the powers of the Prefects were, on the whole, much greater than
those of the royal Intendants: for while the latter were hampered by
the provincial _Parlements_, the nominees of the First Consul had to
deal with councils that retained scarce the shadow of power. The real
authority in local matters rested with the Prefects. The old elective
bodies survived, it is true, but their functions were now mainly
advisory; and, lest their advice should be too copious, the sessions
of the first two bodies were limited to a fortnight a year. Except for
a share in the assessment of taxation, their existence was merely a
screen to hide the reality of the new central despotism.[150]
Beneficent it may have been; and the choice of Prefects was certainly
a proof of Bonaparte's discernment of real merit among men of all
shades of opinion; but for all that, it was a despotism, and one that
has inextricably entwined itself with the whole life of France.[151]

It seems strange that this law should not have aroused fierce
opposition; for it practically gagged democracy in its most
appropriate and successful sphere of action, local self-government,
and made popular election a mere shadow, except in the single act of
the choice of the local _juges de paix_. This was foreseen by the
Liberals in the Tribunate: but their power was small since the
regulations passed in January: and though Daunou, as "reporter,"
sharply criticised this measure, yet he lamely concluded with the
advice that it would be dangerous to reject it. The Tribunes therefore
passed the proposal by 71 votes to 25: and the Corps Legislatif by 217
to 68.

The results of this new local government have often been considered so
favourable as to prove that the genius of the French people requires
central control rather than self-government. But it should be noted
that the conditions of France from 1790 to 1800 were altogether
hostile to the development of free institutions. The fierce feuds at
home, the greed and the class jealousies awakened by confiscation, the
blasts of war and the blight of bankruptcy, would have severely tested
the firmest of local institutions; t