nd second parts
of the twelfth section of the _Inquiry_ are devoted to a condemnation of
excessive scepticism, or Pyrrhonism, with which Hume couples a
caricature of the Cartesian doubt; but, in the third part, a certain
"mitigated scepticism" is recommended and adopted, under the title of
"academical philosophy." After pointing out that a knowledge of the
infirmities of the human understanding, even in its most perfect state,
and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations, is the best
check upon the tendency to dogmatism, Hume continues:--

"Another species of _mitigated_ scepticism, which may be of
advantage to mankind, and which maybe the natural result of the
PYRRHONIAN doubts and scruples, is the limitation of our inquiries
to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of
human understanding. The _imagination_ of man is naturally sublime,
delighted with whatever is remote and extraordinary, and running,
without control, into the most distant parts of space and time in
order to avoid the objects which custom has rendered too familiar
to it. A correct _judgment_ observes a contrary method, and,
avoiding all distant and high inquiries, confines itself to common
life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and
experience; leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of
poets and orators, or to the arts of priests and politicians. To
bring us to so salutary a determination, nothing can be more
serviceable than to be once thoroughly convinced of the force of
the PYRRHONIAN doubt, and of the impossibility that anything but
the strong power of natural instinct could free us from it. Those
who have a propensity to philosophy will still continue their
researches; because they reflect, that, besides the immediate
pleasure attending such an occupation, philosophical decisions are
nothing but the reflections of common life, methodised and
corrected. But they will never be tempted to go beyond common life,
so long as they consider the imperfection of those faculties which
they employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate operations.
While we cannot give a satisfactory reason why we believe, after a
thousand experiments, that a stone will fall or fire burn; can we
ever satisfy ourselves concerning any determination which we may
form with regard