any other
necessary truth. In fact, the man is either very wise or very virtuous,
or very lucky, perhaps all three, who has gone through life without
accumulating a store of such necessary beliefs which he would give a
good deal to be able to disbelieve.

It would be beside the mark to discuss the matter further on the present
occasion. It is sufficient to point out that, whatever may be the
differences, between mathematical and other truths, they do not justify
Hume's statement. And it is, at any rate, impossible to prove, that the
cogency of mathematical first principles is due to anything more than
these circumstances; that the experiences with which they are concerned
are among the first which arise in the mind; that they are so
incessantly repeated as to justify us, according to the ordinary laws of
ideation, in expecting that the associations which they form will be of
extreme tenacity; while the fact, that the expectations based upon them
are always verified, finishes the process of welding them together.

Thus, if the axioms of mathematics are innate, nature would seem to have
taken unnecessary trouble; since the ordinary process of association
appears to be amply sufficient to confer upon them all the universality
and necessity which they actually possess.

Whatever needless admissions Hume may have made respecting other
necessary truths he is quite clear about the axiom of causation, "That
whatever event has a beginning must have a cause;" whether and in what
sense it is a necessary truth; and, that question being decided, whence
it is derived.

With respect to the first question, Hume denies that it is a necessary
truth, in the sense that we are unable to conceive the contrary. The
evidence by which he supports this conclusion in the _Inquiry_, however,
is not strictly relevant to the issue.

"No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the
senses, either the cause which produced it, or the effects which
will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience,
ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of
fact."--(IV. p. 35.)

Abundant illustrations are given of this assertion, which indeed cannot
be seriously doubted; but it does not follow that, because we are
totally unable to say what cause preceded, or what effect will succeed,
any event, we do not necessarily suppose that the event had a cause and
will be succeeded by an effect