of Descartes' assertion that, strictly speaking,
sensations are innate; that is to say, that they are the product of the
reaction of the organ of the mind on the stimulus of an "unknown cause,"
which is Descartes' "je ne sais quoi." Therefore, the difference between
Descartes' opinion and that of Hume resolves itself into this: Given
sensation-experiences, can all the contents of consciousness be derived
from the collocation and metamorphosis of these experiences? Or, are new
elements of consciousness, products of an innate potentiality distinct
from sensibility, added to these? Hume affirms the former position,
Descartes the latter. If the analysis of the phenomena of consciousness
given in the preceding pages is correct, Hume is in error; while the
father of modern philosophy had a truer insight, though he overstated
the case. For want of sufficiently searching psychological
investigations, Descartes was led to suppose that innumerable ideas, the
evolution of which in the course of experience can be demonstrated, were
direct or innate products of the thinking faculty.

As has been already pointed out, it is the great merit of Kant that he
started afresh on the track indicated by Descartes, and steadily upheld
the doctrine of the existence of elements of consciousness, which are
neither sense-experiences nor any modifications of them. We may demur to
the expression that space and time are forms of sensory intuition; but
it imperfectly represents the great fact that co-existence and
succession are mental phenomena not given in the mere sense
experience.[23]

FOOTNOTES:

[22] Remarques de Rene Descartes sur un certain placard imprime aux Pays
Bas vers la fin de l'annee, 1647.--Descartes, _OEuvres_. Ed. Cousin,
x. p. 71.

[23] "Wir koennen uns keinen Gegenstand denken, ohne durch Kategorien;
wir koennen keinen gedachten Gegenstand erkennen, ohne durch
Anschauungen, die jenen Begriffen entsprechen. Nun sind alle unsere
Anschauungen sinnlich, und diese Erkenntniss, so fern der Gegenstand
derselben gegeben ist, ist empirisch. Empirische Erkenntniss aber ist
Erfahrung. Folglich ist uns keine Erkenntniss _a priori_ moeglich, als
lediglich von Gegenstaenden moeglicher Erfahrung."

"Aber diese Erkenntniss, die bloss auf Gegenstaende der Erfahrung
eingeschraenkt ist, ist darum nicht alle von der Erfahrung entlehnt,
sondern was sowohl die reinen Anschauungen, als die reinen
Verstandesbegriffe betrifft, so sind sie Elemente