f the mind makes us acquainted with nothing but certain
events, facts, or phenomena (whichever name be preferred) which pass
over the inward field of view in rapid and, as it may appear on careless
inspection, in disorderly succession, like the shifting patterns of a
kaleidoscope. To all these mental phenomena, or states of our
consciousness,[18] Descartes gave the name of "thoughts,"[19] while
Locke and Berkeley termed them "ideas." Hume, regarding this as an
improper use of the word "idea," for which he proposes another
employment, gives the general name of "perceptions" to all states of
consciousness. Thus, whatever other signification we may see reason to
attach to the word "mind," it is certain that it is a name which is
employed to denote a series of perceptions; just as the word "tune,"
whatever else it may mean, denotes, in the first place, a succession of
musical notes. Hume, indeed, goes further than others when he says
that--
"What we call a mind is nothing but a heap or collection of
different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and
supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity
and identity."--(I. p. 268.)
With this "nothing but," however, he obviously falls into the primal and
perennial error of philosophical speculators--dogmatising from negative
arguments. He may be right or wrong; but the most he, or anybody else,
can prove in favour of his conclusion is, that we know nothing more of
the mind than that it is a series of perceptions. Whether there is
something in the mind that lies beyond the reach of observation; or
whether perceptions themselves are the products of something which can
be observed and which is not mind; are questions which can in nowise be
settled by direct observation. Elsewhere, the objectionable hypothetical
element of the definition of mind is less prominent:--
"The true idea of the human mind is to consider it as a system of
different perceptions, or different existences, which are linked
together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce,
destroy, influence and modify each other.... In this respect I
cannot compare the soul more properly to anything than a republic
or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the
reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to
other persons who propagate the same republic in the incessant
changes
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