ng post on the road between Berryville and Charlestown,
was to remain in the Valley.

On November 7 the situation was as follows:--

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
First Corps Warrenton.
Second Corps Rectortown.
Third Corps Between Manassas Junction and Warrenton.
Fifth Corps White Plains.
Ninth Corps Waterloo.
Eleventh Corps New Baltimore.
Cavalry Division Rappahannock Station and Sperryville.
Line of Supply Orange and Alexandria and Manassas Railways.
Twelfth Corps Harper's Ferry and Sharpsburg.

ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

First Corps Culpeper Court House.
Second Corps Headquarters, Millwood.
Cavalry Division Hampton's and Fitzhugh Lee's Brigades on
the Rappahannock.
Munford's Brigade with Jackson.
Lines of Supply Staunton--Strasburg.
Staunton--Culpeper Court House.
Richmond--Gordonsville.

November 7.

On this date the six corps of the Army of the Potomac which were
assembled between the Bull Run Mountains and the Blue Ridge numbered
125,000 officers and men present for duty, together with 320 guns.

The returns of the Army of Northern Virginia give the following
strength:--
First Army Corps 31,939 112 (54 short-range smooth-bores)
Second Army Corps 31,794 123 (53 short-range smooth-bores)
Cavalry Division 7,176 4
Reserve Artillery 900 36 (20 short-range smooth-bores)
------ ---
71,809 275

The Confederates were not only heavily outnumbered by the force
immediately before them, but along the Potomac, from Washington
westward, was a second hostile army, not indeed so large as that
commanded by McClellan, but larger by several thousands than that
commanded by Lee. The Northern capital held a garrison of 80,000; at
Harper's Ferry were 10,000; in the neighbourhood of Sharpsburg over
4000; along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad 8000. Thus the total
strength of the Federals exceeded 225,000 men. Yet in face of this
enormous host, and with Richmond only weakly garrisoned behind him,
Lee had actually separated his two wings by an interval of sixty
miles. He was evidently playing his old game, dividing his army with
a view to a junction on the field of battle.

Lincoln, in a letter of advice with which he had favoured McClellan a
few days previously, had urged the importance of making Lee's line of
supply the first objective of