emonstration of crossing
into Maryland would serve the same purpose, and might call him back
to the Potomac. As my object is to retard and baffle his designs, if
it can be accomplished by manoeuvring your corps as you propose, it
will serve my purpose as well as if effected in any other way. With
this understanding, you can use your discretion, which I know I can
rely upon, in remaining or advancing up the Valley. Keep me advised
of your movements and intentions; and you must keep always in view
the probability of an attack upon Richmond from either north or
south, when a concentration of force will become necessary."* (* O.R.
volume 19 part 2 page 705.)

Jackson's plan, however, was not destined to be tried. McClellan had
issued orders for the concentration of his army at Warrenton. His
troops had never been in better condition. They were in good spirits,
well supplied and admirably equipped. Owing to the activity of his
cavalry, coupled with the fact that the Confederate horses were at
this time attacked by a disease which affected both tongue and hoof,
his information was more accurate than usual. He knew that Longstreet
was at Culpeper, and Jackson in the Valley. He saw the possibility of
separating the two wings of the enemy's forces, and of either
defeating Longstreet or forcing him to fall back to Gordonsville, and
he had determined to make the attempt.

On the night of November 7, however, at the very moment when his army
was concentrating for an advance against Longstreet, McClellan was
ordered to hand over his command to General Burnside. Lincoln had
yielded to the insistence of McClellan's political opponents, to the
rancour of Stanton, and the jealousy of Halleck. But in sacrificing
the general who had saved the Union at Sharpsburg he sacrificed the
lives of many thousands of his soldiers. A darker day than even the
Second Manassas was in store for the Army of the Potomac. McClellan
was not a general of the first order. But he was the only officer in
the United States who had experience of handling large masses of
troops, and he was improving every day. Stuart had taught him the use
of cavalry, and Lee the value of the initiative. He was by no means
deficient in resolution, as his march with an army of recently
defeated men against Lee in Maryland conclusively proves; and
although he had never won a decisive victory, he possessed, to a
degree which was never attained by any of his successors, the
confiden