fought on the North Anna, thirty-six miles from Fredericksburg,
the result might have been very different. A direct counterstroke
would possibly have been no more practicable than on the
Rappahannock, for the superior numbers of the enemy, and his powerful
artillery, could not have been disregarded. Nor would a direct
pursuit have been a certain means of making success decisive; the
rear of a retreating army, as the Confederates had found to their
cost at Malvern Hill, is usually its strongest part. But a pursuit
directed against the flanks, striking the line of retreat, cutting
off the supply and ammunition trains, and blocking the roads, a
pursuit such as Jackson had organised when he drove Banks from the
Valley, if conducted with vigour, seldom fails in its effect. And who
would have conducted such an operation with greater skill and energy
than Stuart, at the head of his 9000 horsemen? Who would have
supported Stuart more expeditiously than the "foot-cavalry" of the
Second Army Corps?

Lee's position at Fredericksburg, strong as it might appear, was
exceedingly disadvantageous. A position which an army occupies with a
view to decisive battle should fulfil four requirements:--

1. It should not be too strong, or the enemy will not attack it.

2. It should give cover to the troops both from view and fire from
artillery, and have a good field of fire.

3. It should afford facilities for counterstroke.

4. It should afford facilities for pursuit.

Of these Lee's battle-field fulfilled but the first and second. It
would have been an admirable selection if the sole object of the
Confederates had been to gain time, or to prevent the enemy
establishing himself south of the Rappahannock; but to encompass the
destruction of the enemy's whole army it was as ill adapted as
Wellington's position at Torres Vedras, at Busaco, or at Fuentes
d'Onor. But while Wellington in taking up these positions had no
further end in view than holding the French in check, the situation
of the Confederacy was such that a decisive victory was eminently
desirable. Nothing was to be gained by gaining time. The South could
furnish Lee with no further reinforcements. Every able-bodied man was
in the service of his country; and it was perfectly certain that the
Western armies, although they had been generally successful during
the past year, would never be permitted by Mr. Davis to leave the
valley of the Mississippi.

The Army of Northern Virg