easons the Confederate generals were exceedingly careful not
to chill the spirit of enterprise. Errors of judgment were never
considered in the light of crimes; while the officer who, in default
of orders, remained inactive, or who, when his orders were manifestly
inapplicable to a suddenly changed situation, and there was no time
to have them altered, dared not act for himself, was not long
retained in responsible command. In the Army of the Potomac, on the
other hand, centralisation was the rule. McClellan expected blind
obedience from his corps commanders, and nothing more, and Pope
brought Porter to trial for using his own judgment, on occasions when
Pope himself was absent, during the campaign of the Second Manassas.
Thus the Federal soldiers, through no fault of their own, laboured
for the first two years of the war under a disadvantage from which
the wisdom of Lee and Jackson had relieved the Confederates. The Army
of the Potomac was an inert mass, the Army of Northern Virginia a
living organism, endowed with irresistible vigour.

It is to be noted, too, as tending to prove the equal courage of
North and South, that on the Western theatre of war the Federals were
the more successful. And yet the Western armies of the Confederacy
were neither less brave, less hardy, nor less disciplined than those
in Virginia. They were led, however, by inferior men, while, on the
other hand, many of the Northern generals opposed to them possessed
unquestionable ability, and understood the value of a good system of
command.

We may say, then, without detracting an iota from the high reputation
of the Confederate soldiers, that it was not the Army of Northern
Virginia that saved Richmond in 1862, but Lee; not the Army of the
Valley which won the Valley campaign, but Jackson.

It is related that a good priest, once a chaplain in Taylor's
Louisiana brigade, concluded his prayer at the unveiling of the
Jackson monument in New Orleans with these remarkable words: "When in
Thine inscrutable decree it was ordained that the Confederacy should
fail, it became necessary for Thee to remove Thy servant Stonewall
Jackson."* (* Bright Skies and Dark Shadows page 294. H. M. Field,
D.D.) It is unnecessary, perhaps, to lay much forcible emphasis on
the personal factor, but, at the same time, it is exceedingly
essential that it should never be overlooked.

The Government which, either in peace or war, commits the charge of
its armed forces to