the Army of the Potomac as in the Armies of
Northern Virginia and of the Valley it was sound; and the system of
command plays a most important part in war. The natural initiative of
the American, the general fearlessness of responsibility, were as
conspicuous among the soldiers as in the nation at large. To those
familiar with the Official Records, where the doings of regiments and
even companies are preserved, it is perfectly apparent that, so soon
as the officers gained experience, the smaller units were as boldly
and efficiently handled as in the army of Germany under Moltke. But
while Lee and Jackson, by every means in their power, fostered the
capacity for independent action, following therein the example of
Napoleon,* (* In the opinion of the author, the charge of
centralisation preferred against Napoleon can only be applied to his
leading in his later campaigns. In his earlier operations he gave his
generals every latitude, and be maintamed that loose but effective
system of tactics, in which much was left to the individual, adopted
by the French army just previous to the wars of the Revolution.) of
Washington, of Nelson, and of Wellington, and aware that their
strength would thus be doubled, McClellan and Pope did their best to
stifle it; and in the higher ranks they succeeded. In the one case
the generals were taught to wait for orders, in the other to
anticipate them. In the one case, whether troops were supported or
not depended on the word of the commanding general; in the other,
every officer was taught that to sustain his colleagues was his first
duty. It thus resulted that while the Confederate leaders were served
by scores of zealous assistants, actively engaged in furthering the
aim of their superiors, McClellan, Pope, and Fremont, jealous of
power reduced their subordinates, with few exceptions, to the
position of machines, content to obey the letter of their orders,
oblivious of opportunity, and incapable of co-operation. Lee and
Jackson appear to have realised the requirements of battle far more
fully than their opponents. They knew that the scope of the commander
is limited; that once his troops are committed to close action it is
impossible for him to exert further control, for his orders can no
longer reach them; that he cannot keep the whole field under
observation, much less observe every fleeting opportunity. Yet it is
by utilising opportunities that the enemy's strength is sapped. For
these r