ndstill;
and, in the second place, Jackson was unwilling to abandon his post
of vantage behind the Blue Ridge. It need hardly be said that the
policy of manoeuvring instead of intrenching, of aiming at the
enemy's flank and rear instead of barring his advance directly, was
in full agreement with his views of war; and it appears that about
this date he had submitted proposals for a movement against the
Federal communications. It would be interesting indeed to have the
details of his design, but Jackson's letter-book for this period has
unfortunately disappeared, nor did he communicate his ideas to any of
his staff. Letters from General Lee, however, indicate that the
manoeuvre proposed was of the same character as that which brought
Pope in such hot haste from the Rappahannock to Bull Run, and that it
was Jackson's suggestion which caused the Commander-in-Chief to
reconsider his determination of uniting his army.

"As long as General Jackson," wrote Lee to the Secretary of War on
November 10, "can operate with safety, and secure his retirement west
of the Massanutton Mountains, I think it advantageous that he should
be in a position to threaten the enemy's flank and rear, and thus
prevent his advance southward on the east side of the Blue Ridge.
General Jackson has been directed accordingly, and should the enemy
descend into the Valley, General Longstreet will attack his rear, and
cut off his communications. The enemy apparently is so strong in
numbers that I think it preferable to baffle his designs by
manoeuvring, rather than resist his advance by main force, To
accomplish the latter without too great a risk and loss would require
more than double our present numbers."* (* O.R. volume 19 part 2 page
711.)

His letter to Jackson, dated November 9, ran as follows: "The enemy
seems to be massing his troops along the Manassas Railroad in the
vicinity of Piedmont, which gives him great facilities for bringing
up supplies from Alexandria. It has occurred to me that his object
may be to seize upon Strasburg with his main force, to intercept your
ascent of the Valley...This would oblige you to cross into the Lost
River Valley, or west of it, unless you could force a passage through
the Blue Ridge; hence my anxiety for your safety. If you can prevent
such a movement of the enemy, and operate strongly on his flank and
rear through the gaps of the Blue Ridge, you would certainly in my
opinion effect the object you propose. A d