y fair prospects of success. If the lost order had not
fallen into McClellan's hands, Lee in all probability would have had
ample time to select his battlefield and concentrate his army; there
would have been no need of forced marches, and consequently much less
straggling. Both Lee and Jackson counted on the caution of their
opponent. Both were surprised by the unwonted vigour be displayed,
especially at South Mountain and in the march to Sharpsburg. Such
resolution in action, they were aware, was foreign to his nature. "I
cannot understand this move of McClellan's," was Jackson's remark,
when it was reported that the Federal general had boldly advanced
against the strong position on South Mountain. But neither Lee nor
Jackson was aware that McClellan had exact information of their
dispositions, and that the carelessness of a Confederate staff
officer had done more for the Union than all the Northern scouts and
spies in Maryland. Jackson had been disposed to leave a larger margin
for accidents than his commander. He would have left Harper's Ferry
alone, and have fought the Federals in the mountains;* (* Dabney
volume 2 page 302.) and he was probably right, for in the Gettysburg
campaign of the following year, when Lee again crossed the Potomac,
Harper's Ferry was ignored, although occupied by a strong garrison,
and neither in advance nor retreat were the Confederate
communications troubled. But as to the wisdom of giving battle on the
Antietam, after the fall of Harper's Ferry, there was no divergence
of opinion between Lee and his lieutenant. They had no reason to
respect the Union army as a weapon of offence, and very great reason
to believe that McClellan was incapable of wielding it. Their
anticipations were well founded. The Federal attack was badly
designed and badly executed. If it be compared with the German attack
at Worth, the defects of McClellan, the defects of his subordinates,
the want of sound training throughout the whole army, become at once
apparent. On August 6, 1870, there was certainly, early in the day,
much disjointed fighting, due in great part to the difficulties of
the country, the absence of the Crown Prince, and the anxiety of the
generals to render each other loyal support. But when once the
Commander-in-Chief appeared upon the field, and, assuming direction
of the battle, infused harmony into the operations, the strength and
unity of the attack could hardly have been surpassed. Almost at th