ividuals in various forms and degrees of
suffering, they tend continually to remind us, that the present scene is
but the infancy of our existence,--that the beings whom we thus
contemplate are the children of the same Almighty Father with ourselves,
inheriting the same nature, possessed of the same feelings, and soon to
enter upon another state of existence, when all the distinctions which
are to be found in this world shall cease for ever. They tend thus to
withdraw us from the power of self-love, and the deluding influence of
present things; and habitually to raise our views to that future life,
for which the present is intended to prepare us. The due cultivation of
the benevolent affections, therefore, is not properly to be considered
as the object of moral approbation, but rather as a process of moral
culture. They may enable us in some degree to benefit others, but their
chief benefit is to ourselves. By neglecting them, we both incur much
guilt, and deprive ourselves of an important mean of improvement. The
diligent exercise of them, besides being a source of moral advantage, is
accompanied with a degree of mental enjoyment which carries with it its
own reward. Such appears to be the correct view which we ought to take
of the arrangement established by the Creator in this part of our
constitution. It is calculated to correct a misconception of an
important kind, which considers the exercise of the benevolent
affections as possessing a character of merit. To this subject we shall
have occasion to refer more particularly in the sequel.

The exercise of the benevolent affections may be briefly treated of,
under nearly the same heads as those referred to when considering the
principle of Justice;--keeping in mind that they lead to greater
exertion for the benefit of others, and thus often demand a greater
sacrifice of self love, than is included under the mere requirements of
justice. On the other hand, benevolence is not to be exercised at the
expense of Justice; as would be the case, if a man were found relieving
distress by such expedients as involve the necessity of withholding the
payment of just debts, or imply the neglect or infringement of some duty
which he owes to another.

(1.) Compassion and benevolent exertion are due towards alleviating the
distresses of others. This exercise of them, in many instances, calls
for a decided sacrifice of personal interest, and, in others, for
considerable personal exer