t became the basis of its deliberations.
This opinion was shared by many others who appreciated the difficulties
and intricacies of the subject and who felt that a hasty and undigested
report would be unwise and endanger the whole plan of a world
organization.

In view of this situation, which seemed to be a strong argument for
delay in drafting the plan of international organization, I wrote a
letter to the President, at the time I sent him the proposed resolution,
saying that in my opinion no plan could be prepared with sufficient care
to warrant its submission to the Conference on the Preliminaries of
Peace before he left Paris and that unless a plan was reported he would
be in the position of returning empty-handed to the United States. I
urged him in the circumstances to secure the adoption of a resolution by
the delegates similar in nature, if not in language, to the draft which
was enclosed, thereby avoiding a state of affairs which would be very
disheartening to the advocates of a League of Nations and cause general
discontent among all peoples who impatiently expected evidence that the
restoration of peace was not far distant.

It would be presumptuous on my part to speculate on the President's
feelings when he received and read my letter and the proposed
resolution. It was never answered or acknowledged, and he did not act
upon the suggestion or discuss acting upon it, to my knowledge, with any
of his colleagues. On the contrary, he summoned the Commission on the
League of Nations to meet on February 3, eleven days before the date
fixed for his departure for the United States, and laid before that body
his revised draft of a Covenant which formed the groundwork for the
Commission's report presented to the Conference on February 14.

The question naturally arises--Why did the President ask me to complete
and send to him the resolution embodying a series of declarations if he
did not intend to make it a subject of consideration and discussion? It
is a pertinent question, but the true answer remains with Mr. Wilson
himself. Possibly he concluded that the only way to obtain his plan for
a League was to insist upon its practical acceptance before peace was
negotiated, and that, unless he took advantage of the universal demand
for peace by making the acceptance of the Covenant a condition
precedent, he would be unable to obtain its adoption. While I believe
this is a correct supposition, it is not responsive to th