some marvellous feat
of strategy was in process of execution, to the extreme discomfiture
of the United States navy, was natural enough, considering the straits
they were in, and the consciousness of the capable among them that a
squadron of that force never should have been sent across the sea;
but, though natural, the pretension was absurd, and, though echoed by
all the partisan Press in Europe, it did not for a moment impose as
true upon those who were directing the movements of the United States
ships.

FOOTNOTES:

[2] A principal object of these papers, as has been stated, is to form
a correct public opinion; for by public opinion, if misguided, great
embarrassment is often caused to those responsible for the conduct of a
war. As concrete examples teach far better than abstract principles,
the writer suggests to the consideration of his readers how seriously
would have been felt, during the hostilities, the accident which befell
the battleship _Massachusetts_, on Dec. 14, 1898, a month after the
above sentences were written. An injury in battle, engaged without
adequate object, would have had the same effect, and been
indefensible.

IV

PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY CERVERA'S APPEARANCE IN WEST INDIAN
WATERS.--MOVEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES DIVISIONS AND
OF THE OREGON.--FUNCTIONS OF CRUISERS IN A NAVAL
CAMPAIGN.

The departure of Admiral Cervera from Martinique for Curacao was
almost simultaneous with that of Admiral Sampson from San Juan for Key
West. The immediate return of the latter to the westward was dictated
by reasons, already given in his own words, the weight of which he
doubtless felt more forcibly because he found himself actually so far
away from the centre of the blockade and from his base at Key West.
When he began thus to retrace his steps, he was still ignorant of
Cervera's arrival. The following night, indeed, he heard from a
passing vessel the rumor of the Spanish squadron's regaining Cadiz,
with which the Navy Department had been for a moment amused. He
stopped, therefore, to communicate with Washington, intending, if the
rumor were confirmed, to resume the attack upon San Juan. But on the
morning of the 15th--Sunday--at 3.30, his despatch-boat returned to
him with the official intelligence, not only of the enemy's being off
Martinique, but of his arrival at Curacao, which occurred shortly
after daylight of the 14th. The same telegram informed him that the
F