d to leave Spain without
her second division of ships.

Camara's delay at the Mediterranean end of the Canal, which extended
over several days, suggested either doubts as to the reality of his
rumored destination, or a belief that the equipment and
preparation--in coal especially--for so distant an expedition had been
imperfect. This contributed to postpone Watson's departure, and the
first passage of the Canal (July 2nd) by the Spaniards coincided in
date very closely with the destruction of their other division under
Cervera. After the action off Santiago the battleships needed to be
again supplied with ammunition, and before that could be effected
Camara was on his way back to Spain.

This abandonment by the enemy of their projected voyage to Manila
concurred with the critical position of the army before Santiago to
postpone the project of reinforcing Dewey, who no longer needed
battleships so far as his immediate operations were concerned.
Besides, the arrival of both the _Monterey_ and the _Monadnock_ was
now assured, even if the enemy resumed his movement, which was
scarcely possible. When Santiago fell, however, it was felt to be
necessary to re-establish our fleet in the Pacific, by way either of
the Straits of Magellan or of the Suez Canal. The latter was chosen,
and the entire battle fleet--except the _Texas_, rejected on account
of her small coal endurance--was directed to join the movement and to
accompany some distance within the straits the two battleships which,
with their smaller cruisers and colliers, were to go to Manila. The
preparations for this movement were kept secret for quite a time,
under the cover of an avowed intention to proceed against Puerto Rico;
but nothing, apparently, can wholly escape the prying curiosity of the
Press, which dignifies this not always reputable quality with the
title of "enterprise." No great harm resulted; possibly even the
evident wish of the Government for secrecy, though thus betrayed, may
have increased the apprehension of the enemy as to the damage intended
to their coasts.

On the latter point the position of our Government, as understood by
the writer, was perfectly simple. In case the enemy refused peace when
resistance was obviously and utterly hopeless, bombardment of a
seaport might be resorted to, but with the utmost reluctance, and
merely to compel submission and acquiescence in demonstrated facts. It
is not possible to allow one's own people to be ki