advantage of
distance. Matanzas is but Havana; he would find himself anticipated
there, because one of those vessels dogging his path would have
hurried on to announce his approach. Were his destination, however,
evidently a North Atlantic port, as some among us had fondly feared,
our division before Havana would be recalled by cable, and that before
Cienfuegos drawn back to Havana, leaving, of course, lookouts before
the southern port. Cienfuegos is thereby uncovered, doubtless; but
either the Spaniard fails to get there, not knowing our movements, or,
if he rightly divines them and turns back, our coast is saved.
Strategy is a game of wits, with many unknown quantities; as Napoleon
and Nelson have said--and not they alone--the unforeseen and chance
must always be allowed for. But, if there are in it no absolute
certainties, there are practical certainties, raised by experience to
maxims, reasonable observance of which gives long odds. Prominent
among these certainties are the value of the offensive over the
defensive, the advantage of a central position, and of interior lines.
All these would have been united, strategically, by placing our
armored divisions before Havana and Cienfuegos. As an offensive step,
this supported, beyond any chance of defeat, the blockade of the Cuban
coast, as proclaimed, with the incidental additional advantage that
Key West, our base, was not only accessible to us, but defended
against serious attack, by the mere situation of our Havana squadron.
Central position and interior lines were maintained, for, Havana being
nearly equidistant from Puerto Rico and the Chesapeake, the squadrons
could be moved in the shortest time in either direction, and they
covered all points of offence and defence within the limits of the
theatre of war by lines shorter than those open to the enemy, which is
what "interior lines" practically means.
If this disposition did possess these advantages, the question
naturally arises whether it was expedient for the Havana division,
before Cervera's arrival was known, and with the Flying Squadron still
at Hampton Roads, to move to the eastward to San Juan, as was done.
The motive of this step, in which the Navy Department acquiesced, was
the probability, which must be fully admitted, that San Juan was
Cervera's primary destination. If it so proved, our squadron would be
nearer at hand. It was likely, of course, that Cervera would first
communicate with a neutral po
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