ty which
justifies practical action in all life, and especially in war. There
was not certainty enough to draw away our ships from before
Havana,--to the exposure also of Key West,--but there was quite
sufficient certainty to take the chance of leaving Cienfuegos and
going off Santiago; for, to put the case at its weakest, we could not
close both ports, and had, therefore, to make a choice. Against the
risk of the enemy trying to dash out of Santiago and run for some
other point, provision was made by a telegram to the _Yale_ to inform
every vessel off Santiago that the Flying Squadron was off Cienfuegos,
and that orders had been sent it to proceed with all possible despatch
off Santiago. If, therefore, the enemy did run out before the arrival
of Schley, our scouts would know where to look for the latter; that
is, somewhere on the shortest line between the two ports.

The embarrassment imposed upon the Department, under the telegram that
the Flying Squadron was returning to Key West, was increased greatly
by the fact that the five cruisers ordered before the port were
getting very short of coal. If the squadron held its ground, this was
comparatively immaterial. It would be injurious, unquestionably, to
the communications and to the lookout, but not necessarily fatal to
the object in view, which was that Cervera should not get out without
a fight and slip away again into the unknown. But, if the squadron
went, the cruisers could not stay, and the enemy might escape
unobserved. Fortunately, on second thoughts, the Commodore decided to
remain; but before that was known to the Department, Sampson had been
directed, on May 29th, to proceed with the _New York_ and the
_Oregon_, the latter of which had only joined him on the 28th. The
telegram announcing that the Flying Squadron would hold on came indeed
before the two ships started, but it was not thought expedient to
change their orders. Word also had then been received that two of the
Spanish division had been sighted inside from our own vessels, and
though this still left a doubt as to the whereabouts of the others, it
removed the necessity of covering Key West, which had caused the
Department, on the first knowledge of Schley's returning, to limit its
orders to Sampson to be ready to set out for Santiago the instant the
Flying Squadron returned. By the departure of the _New York_ and the
_Oregon_, the _Indiana_ was left the only battleship to the westward.
Her speed was