being outside of practical international politics, until at least the
nations are ready for the intermediate step of moral compulsion,
imposed by a self-assumed obligation--by a promise. Compulsory
arbitration as yet means only the moral compulsion of a pledge, taken
beforehand, and more or less comprehensive, to submit to arbitration
questions which rest still in the unknown future; the very terms of
which therefore cannot be foreseen. Although there is a certain active
current of agitation in favor of such stipulations, there is no
general disposition of governments to accede, except under very narrow
and precise limitations, and in questions of less than secondary
importance.
Secondly, there appears to be, on the other hand, a much greater
disposition than formerly to entertain favorably the idea of
arbitration, as a means to be in all cases considered, and where
possible to be adopted, in order to solve peaceably difficulties which
threaten peace. In short, the consciences of the nations are awake to
the wickedness of unnecessary war, and are disposed, as a general
rule, to seek first, and where admissible, the counterpoise of an
impartial judge, where such can be found, to correct the bias of
national self-will; but there is an absolute indisposition, an
instinctive revolt, against signing away, beforehand, the national
conscience, by a promise that any other arbiter than itself shall be
accepted in questions of the future, the import of which cannot yet be
discerned. Of this feeling the vague and somewhat clumsy phrase,
"national honor and vital interests," has in the past been the
expression; for its very indeterminateness reserved to conscience in
every case the decision,--"May another judge for me here, or must I be
bound by my own sense of right?"
Under these circumstances, and having reached so momentous a stage in
progress as is indicated by the very calling together of a world
conference for the better assuring of peace, may it not be well for us
to pause a moment and take full account of the idea, Arbitration, on
the right hand and on the left? Noble and beneficent in its true
outlines, it too may share, may even now be sharing, the liability of
the loftiest conceptions to degenerate into catchwords, or into cant.
"Liberty, what crimes have been wrought in thy name!" and does not
religion share the same reproach, and conscience also? Yet will we not
away with any of the three.
The conviction of a n
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