through her experience of the
defenceless state of the harbor at Guantanamo, which she could have
communicated to Schley. The latter, when he arrived off Santiago on
the evening of the 26th, found the _Minneapolis_, the _St. Paul_, and
the _Yale_ on the ground. The _Harvard_ had already been there, but
had gone for the moment to St. Nicolas Mole, with despatches that the
Commodore had sent before him from Cienfuegos. She joined the squadron
again early next day, May 27th.
On the morning of the 25th, the _St. Paul_ had captured the British
steamer _Restormel_, with 2,400 tons of coal for the Spanish squadron.
This vessel had gone first to Puerto Rico, and from there had been
directed to Curacao, where she arrived two days after Cervera had
departed. When taken she reported that two other colliers were in
Puerto Rico when she sailed thence. This would seem to indicate that
that port, and not Santiago, had been the original destination of the
enemy, for it would have been quite as easy for the colliers to go to
Santiago at once; probably safer, for we were not then thinking of
Santiago in comparison with San Juan. This conjecture is strengthened
by the fact that there were only 2,300 tons of Cardiff coal in
Santiago, a condition which shows both how little the Spanish
Government expected to use the port and how serious this capture at
this instant was to the enemy.
The intention of Commodore Schley to return to Key West precipitated
the movement of Admiral Sampson, with his two fastest ships, to
Santiago; but the step would certainly have been taken as soon as the
doubt whether all the Spanish division had entered was removed. The
Department, under its growing conviction that the enemy was there, had
already been increasingly disturbed by the delay of the Flying
Squadron before Cienfuegos. This delay was due to the uncertainty of
its commander as to whether or not Cervera was in the latter port; nor
was there then known reason to censure the decision of the officer on
the spot, whose information, dependent upon despatch vessels, or upon
local scouting, was necessarily, in some respects, more meagre than
that of the Department, in cable communication with many quarters.
Nevertheless, he was mistaken, and each succeeding hour made the
mistake more palpable and more serious to those in Washington; not,
indeed, that demonstrative proof had been received there--far from
it--but there was that degree of reasonable probabili
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