ny power or habit depends on the relation
of that power or habit to its object. Now the object of faith can be
considered in three ways. For, since "to believe" is an act of the
intellect, in so far as the will moves it to assent, as stated above
(A. 1, ad 3), the object of faith can be considered either on the part
of the intellect, or on the part of the will that moves the intellect.
If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then two things can
be observed in the object of faith, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). One
of these is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of
faith is "to believe in a God"; because, as stated above (ibid.)
nothing is proposed to our belief, except in as much as it is
referred to God. The other is the formal aspect of the object, for it
is the medium on account of which we assent to such and such a point
of faith; and thus an act of faith is "to believe God," since, as
stated above (ibid.) the formal object of faith is the First Truth,
to Which man gives his adhesion, so as to assent for Its sake to
whatever he believes.
Thirdly, if the object of faith be considered in so far as the
intellect is moved by the will, an act of faith is "to believe in
God." For the First Truth is referred to the will, through having the
aspect of an end.
Reply Obj. 1: These three do not denote different acts of faith, but
one and the same act having different relations to the object of
faith.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply Obj. 3: Unbelievers cannot be said "to believe in a God" as
we understand it in relation to the act of faith. For they do not
believe that God exists under the conditions that faith determines;
hence they do not truly imply believe in a God, since, as the
Philosopher observes (Metaph. ix, text. 22) "to know simple things
defectively is not to know them at all."
Reply Obj. 4: As stated above (I-II, Q. 9, A. 1) the will moves the
intellect and the other powers of the soul to the end: and in this
respect an act of faith is "to believe in God."
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 3]
Whether It Is Necessary for Salvation to Believe Anything Above the
Natural Reason?
Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary for salvation to believe
anything above the natural reason. For the salvation and perfection of
a thing seem to be sufficiently insured by its natural endowments. Now
matters of faith, surpass man's natural rea
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