.

Reply Obj. 3: Although all things that can be known by science are
of one common scientific aspect, they do not all alike lead man to
beatitude: hence they are not all equally proposed to our belief.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 5]

Whether Man Is Bound to Believe Anything Explicitly?

Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound to believe anything
explicitly. For no man is bound to do what is not in his power. Now it
is not in man's power to believe a thing explicitly, for it is written
(Rom. 10:14, 15): "How shall they believe Him, of whom they have not
heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they
preach unless they be sent?" Therefore man is not bound to believe
anything explicitly.

Obj. 2: Further, just as we are directed to God by faith, so are we
by charity. Now man is not bound to keep the precepts of charity, and
it is enough if he be ready to fulfil them: as is evidenced by the
precept of Our Lord (Matt. 5:39): "If one strike thee on one [Vulg.:
'thy right'] cheek, turn to him also the other"; and by others of the
same kind, according to Augustine's exposition (De Serm. Dom. in
Monte xix). Therefore neither is man bound to believe anything
explicitly, and it is enough if he be ready to believe whatever God
proposes to be believed.

Obj. 3: Further, the good of faith consists in obedience, according
to Rom. 1:5: "For obedience to the faith in all nations." Now the
virtue of obedience does not require man to keep certain fixed
precepts, but it is enough that his mind be ready to obey, according
to Ps. 118:60: "I am ready and am not troubled; that I may keep Thy
commandments." Therefore it seems enough for faith, too, that man
should be ready to believe whatever God may propose, without his
believing anything explicitly.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 11:6): "He that cometh to God,
must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him."

_I answer that,_ The precepts of the Law, which man is bound to
fulfil, concern acts of virtue which are the means of attaining
salvation. Now an act of virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 5)
depends on the relation of the habit to its object. Again two things
may be considered in the object of any virtue; namely, that which is
the proper and direct object of that virtue, and that which is
accidental and consequent to the object properly so called. Thus it
belongs properly and direct