stance of Things to Be Hoped For, the Evidence of Things That
Appear Not?"

Objection 1: It would seem that the Apostle gives an unfitting
definition of faith (Heb. 11:1) when he says: "Faith is the substance
of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not."
For no quality is a substance: whereas faith is a quality, since it
is a theological virtue, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 3).
Therefore it is not a substance.

Obj. 2: Further, different virtues have different objects. Now things
to be hoped for are the object of hope. Therefore they should not be
included in a definition of faith, as though they were its object.

Obj. 3: Further, faith is perfected by charity rather than by hope,
since charity is the form of faith, as we shall state further on (A.
3). Therefore the definition of faith should have included the thing
to be loved rather than the thing to be hoped for.

Obj. 4: Further, the same thing should not be placed in different
genera. Now "substance" and "evidence" are different genera, and
neither is subalternate to the other. Therefore it is unfitting to
state that faith is both "substance" and "evidence."

Obj. 5: Further, evidence manifests the truth of the matter for which
it is adduced. Now a thing is said to be apparent when its truth is
already manifest. Therefore it seems to imply a contradiction to
speak of "evidence of things that appear not": and so faith is
unfittingly defined.

_On the contrary,_ The authority of the Apostle suffices.

_I answer that,_ Though some say that the above words of the Apostle are
not a definition of faith, yet if we consider the matter aright, this
definition overlooks none of the points in reference to which faith
can be defined, albeit the words themselves are not arranged in the
form of a definition, just as the philosophers touch on the principles
of the syllogism, without employing the syllogistic form.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that since habits are
known by their acts, and acts by their objects, faith, being a habit,
should be defined by its proper act in relation to its proper object.
Now the act of faith is to believe, as stated above (Q. 2, AA. 2, 3),
which is an act of the intellect determinate to one object of the
will's command. Hence an act of faith is related both to the object
of the will, i.e. to the good and the end, and to the object of the
intellect, i.e. to the true. And since faith, through being a