bove (I-II, Q. 3, A. 8) that man's
ultimate happiness consists in a supernatural vision of God: to which
vision man cannot attain unless he be taught by God, according to
John 6:45: "Every one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned
cometh to Me." Now man acquires a share of this learning, not indeed
all at once, but by little and little, according to the mode of his
nature: and every one who learns thus must needs believe, in order
that he may acquire science in a perfect degree; thus also the
Philosopher remarks (De Soph. Elench. i, 2) that "it behooves a
learner to believe."
Hence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision of heavenly
happiness, he must first of all believe God, as a disciple believes
the master who is teaching him.
Reply Obj. 1: Since man's nature is dependent on a higher nature,
natural knowledge does not suffice for its perfection, and some
supernatural knowledge is necessary, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as man assents to first principles, by the natural
light of his intellect, so does a virtuous man, by the habit of
virtue, judge aright of things concerning that virtue; and in this
way, by the light of faith which God bestows on him, a man assents to
matters of faith and not to those which are against faith.
Consequently "there is no" danger or "condemnation to them that are
in Christ Jesus," and whom He has enlightened by faith.
Reply Obj. 3: In many respects faith perceives the invisible things
of God in a higher way than natural reason does in proceeding to God
from His creatures. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 3:25): "Many things
are shown to thee above the understandings of man."
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 2, Art. 4]
Whether It Is Necessary to Believe Those Things Which Can Be Proved
by Natural Reason?
Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary to believe those things which
can be proved by natural reason. For nothing is superfluous in God's
works, much less even than in the works of nature. Now it is
superfluous to employ other means, where one already suffices.
Therefore it would be superfluous to receive by faith, things that
can be known by natural reason.
Obj. 2: Further, those things must be believed, which are the object
of faith. Now science and faith are not about the same object, as
stated above (Q. 1, AA. 4, 5). Since therefore all things that can be
known by natural reason are an object of science, it seems that there
is n
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