thing we understand, and the very truth considered in
itself of the proposition understood. In this way, so long as the
state of faith lasts, we cannot understand those things which are the
direct object of faith: although certain other things that are
subordinate to faith can be understood even in this way.

In another way we understand a thing imperfectly, when the essence of
a thing or the truth of a proposition is not known as to its quiddity
or mode of being, and yet we know that whatever be the outward
appearances, they do not contradict the truth, in so far as we
understand that we ought not to depart from matters of faith, for the
sake of things that appear externally. In this way, even during the
state of faith, nothing hinders us from understanding even those
things which are the direct object of faith.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first three
argue in reference to perfect understanding, while the last refers to
the understanding of matters subordinate to faith.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 8, Art. 3]

Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Merely Speculative or Also
Practical?

Objection 1: It would seem that understanding, considered as a gift of
the Holy Ghost, is not practical, but only speculative. For, according
to Gregory (Moral. i, 32), "understanding penetrates certain more
exalted things." But the practical intellect is occupied, not with
exalted, but with inferior things, viz. singulars, about which actions
are concerned. Therefore understanding, considered as a gift, is not
practical.

Obj. 2: Further, the gift of understanding is something more
excellent than the intellectual virtue of understanding. But the
intellectual virtue of understanding is concerned with none but
necessary things, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 6). Much
more, therefore, is the gift of understanding concerned with none but
necessary matters. Now the practical intellect is not about necessary
things, but about things which may be otherwise than they are, and
which may result from man's activity. Therefore the gift of
understanding is not practical.

Obj. 3: Further, the gift of understanding enlightens the mind in
matters which surpass natural reason. Now human activities, with
which the practical intellect is concerned, do not surpass natural
reason, which is the directing principle in matters of action, as was
made clear above (I-II, Q. 58, A. 2; I-II, Q.