s be done away. Thus with the
advent of clear vision, faith is done away, because it is essentially
"of the things that appear not." When, however, imperfection is not
inseparable from the imperfect thing, the same identical thing which
was imperfect becomes perfect. Thus childhood is not essential to man
and consequently the same identical subject who was a child, becomes
a man. Now lifelessness is not essential to faith, but is accidental
thereto as stated above. Therefore lifeless faith itself becomes
living.

Reply Obj. 2: That which makes an animal live is inseparable from an
animal, because it is its substantial form, viz. the soul:
consequently a dead thing cannot become a living thing, and a living
and a dead thing differ specifically. On the other hand that which
gives faith its form, or makes it live, is not essential to faith.
Hence there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 3: Grace causes faith not only when faith begins anew to
be in a man, but also as long as faith lasts. For it has been said
above (I, Q. 104, A. 1; I-II, Q. 109, A. 9) that God is always
working man's justification, even as the sun is always lighting up
the air. Hence grace is not less effective when it comes to a
believer than when it comes to an unbeliever: since it causes faith
in both, in the former by confirming and perfecting it, in the latter
by creating it anew.

We might also reply that it is accidental, namely on account of the
disposition of the subject, that grace does not cause faith in one
who has it already: just as, on the other hand, a second mortal sin
does not take away grace from one who has already lost it through a
previous mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 4: When living faith becomes lifeless, faith is not
changed, but its subject, the soul, which at one time has faith
without charity, and at another time, with charity.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 5]

Whether Faith Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not a virtue. For virtue
is directed to the good, since "it is virtue that makes its subject
good," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 6). But faith is
directed to the true. Therefore faith is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, infused virtue is more perfect than acquired virtue.
Now faith, on account of its imperfection, is not placed among the
acquired intellectual virtues, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi,
3). Much less, therefore, can it be considered an infused virtu