principles of a thing,
make[s] it apparent, whereas evidence taken from Divine authority
does not make a thing apparent in itself, and such is the evidence
referred to in the definition of faith.
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 4, Art. 2]
Whether Faith Resides in the Intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith does not reside in the
intellect. For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith
resides in the believer's will." Now the will is a power distinct
from the intellect. Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect.
Obj. 2: Further, the assent of faith to believe anything, proceeds
from the will obeying God. Therefore it seems that faith owes all its
praise to obedience. Now obedience is in the will. Therefore faith is
in the will, and not in the intellect.
Obj. 3: Further, the intellect is either speculative or practical.
Now faith is not in the speculative intellect, since this is not
concerned with things to be sought or avoided, as stated in _De
Anima_ iii, 9, so that it is not a principle of operation, whereas
"faith . . . worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). Likewise, neither is
it in the practical intellect, the object of which is some true,
contingent thing, that can be made or done. For the object of faith
is the Eternal Truth, as was shown above (Q. 1, A. 1). Therefore
faith does not reside in the intellect.
_On the contrary,_ Faith is succeeded by the heavenly vision,
according to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark
manner; but then face to face." Now vision is in the intellect.
Therefore faith is likewise.
_I answer that,_ Since faith is a virtue, its act must needs be
perfect. Now, for the perfection of an act proceeding from two active
principles, each of these principles must be perfect: for it is not
possible for a thing to be sawn well, unless the sawyer possess the
art, and the saw be well fitted for sawing. Now, in a power of the
soul, which is related to opposite objects, a disposition to act well
is a habit, as stated above (I-II, Q. 49, A. 4, ad 1, 2, 3).
Wherefore an act that proceeds from two such powers must be perfected
by a habit residing in each of them. Again, it has been stated above
(Q. 2, AA. 1, 2) that to believe is an act of the intellect inasmuch
as the will moves it to assent. And this act proceeds from the will
and the intellect, both of which have a natural aptitude to be
perfected in this way. Consequently, if the a
|