nd is the last end, while the
secondary end is that which is referred to an end. In like manner the
principal efficient cause is the first agent, while the secondary
efficient cause is the secondary and instrumental agent. Now hope
regards eternal happiness as its last end, and the Divine assistance
as the first cause leading to happiness.

Accordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any good save
happiness, as one's last end, but only as something referred to final
happiness, so too, it is unlawful to hope in any man, or any
creature, as though it were the first cause of movement towards
happiness. It is, however, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as
being the secondary and instrumental agent through whom one is helped
to obtain any goods that are ordained to happiness. It is in this way
that we turn to the saints, and that we ask men also for certain
things; and for this reason some are blamed in that they cannot be
trusted to give help.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 5]

Whether Hope Is a Theological Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For
a theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now hope has
for its object not only God but also other goods which we hope to
obtain from God. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two
vices, as stated above (I-II, Q. 64, A. 4). But hope is a mean
between presumption and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological
virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a
species of fortitude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation, it
seems that hope is not a theological, but a moral virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it
belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the
arduous. Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13) together with faith
and charity, which are theological virtues.

_I answer that,_ Since specific differences, by their very nature,
divide a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place
hope, we must observe whence it derives its character of virtue.

Now it has been stated above (A. 1) that hope has the character of
virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human
actions: and this it atta