unishment is directed to God as its end, and
that, consequently, it is not feared as the greatest evil, which is
the case with one who has charity. For the species of a habit is not
destroyed through its object or end being directed to a further end.
Consequently servile fear is substantially good, but is servility is
evil.

Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Augustine is to be applied to a man who
does something through servile fear as such, so that he loves not
justice, and fears nothing but the punishment.

Reply Obj. 2: Servile fear as to its substance is not born of pride,
but its servility is, inasmuch as man is unwilling, by love, to
subject his affections to the yoke of justice.

Reply Obj. 3: Mercenary love is that whereby God is loved for the
sake of worldly goods, and this is, of itself, contrary to charity,
so that mercenary love is always evil. But servile fear, as to its
substance, implies merely fear of punishment, whether or not this be
feared as the principal evil.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 5]

Whether Servile Fear Is Substantially the Same As Filial Fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is substantially the
same as filial fear. For filial fear is to servile fear the same
apparently as living faith is to lifeless faith, since the one is
accompanied by mortal sin and the other not. Now living faith and
lifeless faith are substantially the same. Therefore servile and
filial fear are substantially the same.

Obj. 2: Further, habits are diversified by their objects. Now the
same thing is the object of servile and of filial fear, since they
both fear God. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially
the same.

Obj. 3: Further, just as man hopes to enjoy God and to obtain favors
from Him, so does he fear to be separated from God and to be punished
by Him. Now it is the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy God, and to
receive other favors from Him, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 2, ad 2).
Therefore filial fear, whereby we fear separation from God, is the
same as servile fear whereby we fear His punishments.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) says
that there are two fears, one servile, another filial or chaste fear.

_I answer that,_ The proper object of fear is evil. And since acts
and habits are diversified by their objects, as shown above (I-II, Q.
54, A. 2), it follows of necessity that different kinds of fear
correspond to