ffect is done away, not only when the first cause
is removed, but also when the secondary cause is removed. Hence the
movement of hope can be done away, not only by the removal of the
universal estimate of faith, which is, so to say, the first cause of
the certainty of hope, but also by the removal of the particular
estimate, which is the secondary cause, as it were.

Reply Obj. 2: If anyone were to judge, in universal, that God's mercy
is not infinite, he would be an unbeliever. But he who despairs
judges not thus, but that, for him in that state, on account of some
particular disposition, there is no hope of the Divine mercy.

The same answer applies to the Third Objection, since the Novatians
denied, in universal, that there is remission of sins in the Church.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 20, Art. 3]

Whether Despair Is the Greatest of Sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not the greatest of sins.
For there can be despair without unbelief, as stated above (A. 2).
But unbelief is the greatest of sins because it overthrows the
foundation of the spiritual edifice. Therefore despair is not the
greatest of sins.

Obj. 2: Further, a greater evil is opposed to a greater good, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 10). But charity is greater than
hope, according to 1 Cor. 13:13. Therefore hatred of God is a greater
sin than despair.

Obj. 3: Further, in the sin of despair there is nothing but
inordinate aversion from God: whereas in other sins there is not only
inordinate aversion from God, but also an inordinate conversion.
Therefore the sin of despair is not more but less grave than other
sins.

_On the contrary,_ An incurable sin seems to be most grievous,
according to Jer. 30:12: "Thy bruise is incurable, thy wound is very
grievous." Now the sin of despair is incurable, according to Jer.
15:18: "My wound is desperate so as to refuse to be healed." [*Vulg.:
"Why is my wound," etc.] Therefore despair is a most grievous sin.

_I answer that,_ Those sins which are contrary to the theological
virtues are in themselves more grievous than others: because, since
the theological virtues have God for their object, the sins which are
opposed to them imply aversion from God directly and principally. Now
every mortal sin takes its principal malice and gravity from the fact
of its turning away from God, for if it were possible to turn to a
mutable good, even inordinately, without turning